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 No One Talks to the Generals 
Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 5 (December 2009) 
By Peter A. Coclanis 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed 
here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the 
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
The trials of Aung San Suu Kyi, the courageous and much admired Burmese opposition political 
leader who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, never seem to end. With elections in Burma 
scheduled for 2010, even long-time observers sensed—or at least hoped—that earlier this year 
an opening of sorts might be made for “the Lady,” who has been under house arrest for most of 
the past two decades. Better late than never, right? Ms. Suu Kyi, leader of the National League 
for Democracy (NLD), should have become Prime Minister of the country twenty years earlier, of 
course, after the NLD won the last real election in the country. But the 1990 election results were 
annulled, and “the Lady” was already under house arrest in any case. 
Supporters’ 2009 hopes came a cropper beginning in early May, after an incident that can only be 
characterized as bizarre: Ms. Suu Kyi’s alleged sheltering for two days of a beached swimmer—a 
middle-aged American named John William Yettaw—when he made land at her house on Inya 
Lake in Rangoon. Because Ms. Suu Kyi’s alleged actions violated the terms of her house arrest, 
she and two house servants were tried this summer, as we all know, at Insein Prison just outside 
Rangoon. The verdict on August 11—three years of hard labor, quickly commuted to eighteen 
additional months of house arrest in Rangoon—was certainly no surprise to anyone who has 
been followed Ms. Suu Kyi’s trials and tribulations over the years. 
This fall, however, things began to get strange, and have been getting curiouser and curiouser 
ever since. In September, senior U.S. officials began meeting with representatives of the junta. 
Then in October, seemingly out of nowhere, the military government permitted Ms. Suu Kyi to 
meet several times with foreign diplomats, such meetings reportedly coming after “the Lady” 
wrote to junta chief Than Shwe suggesting ways to get international sanctions lifted against the 
SPDC (State Peace and Development Council), the Burmese military regime. Although it is still 
unclear what will come of these unforeseen developments, there now exists at least a margin of 
hope that some progress will be made in peacefully reconciling various constituencies in 
Myanmar/Burma. 
The chances for real progress in my view would be enhanced if the international press would both 
cover Ms. Suu Kyi a bit more objectively—she is admirable in many ways, but like the rest of us 
has her faults—and at least make an attempt to understand the position, strategy, and worldview 
of the other principals in this narrative: The generals running the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC). Indeed, as much or more ink has been spilt on Ms. Suu Kyi’s attire, demeanor, 
and flower-festooned hair and on the motives of Yettaw, the buffoonish swimmer, as on analyzing 
why Than Shwe and the rest of the ruling junta think and act the way they do. 
To be sure, it is easy enough to paint Ms. Suu Kyi as a brilliant, 100 percent- pure moralist and to 
write off the generals as a bunch of uneducated, xenophobic, kleptocrats, and call it a day. In so 
doing, however, one must somehow suppress the uncomfortable fact that Ms. Suu Kyi’s political 
ideology is rather more a muddled mishmash of garden-variety rights talk, Buddhist musings, and 
vaguely Fabianist clichés than a coherent, much less systematic system of thought, which 
certainly correlates with the additional fact that she graduated with a third-class degree at Oxford, 
and, why, according to her biographer Justin Wintle, she was rejected by the PhD program in 
PPE (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics) at the University of London’s School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS). Similarly, apotheosizing Ms. Suu Kyi makes it difficult to explain why in 
1985--twenty three years’ into the generals’ reign—she authored a breezy travel guide entitled 
Let’s Visit Burma, which book she later said she only wrote to pay her sons’ school fees in Britain. 
And in dismissing the generals as irrelevant objects of study, one reduces them to caricatures, 
and, more important, demonstrates disdain toward history and the possibility that time and 
context matter very much. 
For example, one doesn’t have to buy the generals’ contentions that Burma would fall apart in 
short order without military rule to acknowledge the fact that the military, for better or worse, is 
clearly one of the few forces capable of holding together the multi-ethnic nation. Nor does one 
have to endorse the junta’s authoritarian ways, or its fixation with order (let alone its rent-seeking 
behavior) to appreciate the fact that few places on earth have experienced the devastation, 
dislocations, and human suffering –much of which imposed from without—that Burma has since 
at least the 1930s. 
Anyone who follows Burma/Myanmar, even casually, will recall the misery in the south of the 
country brought on by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, but few know anything about the country’s 
calamitous history over the past eighty years. For starters, how about economic depression, a 
millenarian revolt, and anti-colonial struggles in the 1930s, horrific death and destruction during 
the Second World War, a difficult and bloody decolonization campaign against the British in the 
late ‘40s (during which Ms. Suu Kyi’s father, General Aung San, the struggle’s principal hero, was 
assassinated), the destabilizing presence of Chiang Kai Shek and the military forces of the 
Kuomintang (supplied by the U.S.) in the 1950s, and numerous and seemingly endless 
secessionist struggles, some of them extremely violent, from independence in 1948 down to the 
present day? And these events and episodes hardly exhaust the register of difficulties—the 
disorder and early sorrow, as Mann might have put it—that the young nation of Burma has gone 
through, again, much of it externally induced. 
Instability, dislocation, and the threat of outside influence, pressure, and control, then, are the 
defining characteristics of Burma’s modern history—particularly from the military’s point of view. 
Faced with increasingly inept and ineffective civilian governments in the late 50s and early 60s, 
the generals therefore moved in, decisively and most tenaciously with Ne Win’s coup in 1962. 
That the generals’ subsequent attempts over the next half century to isolate Burma from the 
outside world, to impose economic autarky, and to crush democratic dissent failed, often 
miserably, does not absolve outsiders from trying to understand the context for the generals’ 
policy preferences, including their consistently harsh polices toward Ms. Suu Kyi. 
To appreciate their approach to Ms. Suu Kyi, the daughter of Burma’s “George Washington,” one 
can do worse than to draw an analogy between Aung San and “the Lady,” on the one hand, and 
the father of our country, on the other. Pretend for a moment that George Washington had a 
young son, who, a decade or so after the bloody battles of the American Revolution came to an 
end, quit the new nation for the detested colonizing power, Great Britain. Once in Britain, the 
scion of the President went to school, got married to a Brit, started a family, and launched a 
career there. Around 1815 or so, he happened to come back to the U.S. on a private visit in the 
midst of a national political crisis. Anti-governmental dissenters, sensing the political and PR uses 
that could be made of the Washington name, opportunistically offer George’s son the Number 1 
position in the anti-government movement, which is accepted as once. Think the American 
government in power, a fiercely nationalistic one in 1815, would appreciate this expatriate 
Georgie-come-lately, particularly if Georgie just came back after twenty-odd years of living in 
Britain? 
Change the name from Washington to Aung San, the gender from male to female, the date from 
1815 to 1988, and alter the biographical detail slightly to fit Ms. Suu Kyi if you want some sense 
of where the leaders of the SPDC are coming from. If not, you can just smugly attribute 
everything to the generals’ ignorance, xenophobia, and corruption and be on your way. 
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